

TCS-2969-58  
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28 March 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Project Director

SUBJECT : TALENT/AQUATONE Security

1. My apologies for the delay in submitting the attached. I needn't explain to you that finding a solution to this problem has been painful at times though I believe the one now proposed is practical and provides necessary controls.

2. The first paper underlying this note is reluctantly concurred in by the Army and Navy who, while willing to go along, feel that it is unnecessary and fear that it will impose additional bureaucratic burdens. I have tried to persuade them that I believe it will cause less rather than more administrative problems. The Air Force, in addition to feeling as the Army and Navy, is nonetheless willing to give the matter the old school try provided, however, that they can work out a proper relationship between what is proposed here and the AQUATONE clearance procedures as applicable on Geary's and Ops' side. While I believe there is a problem here, the initial approach to the problem must be on the part of the Project Security Officer rather than myself. AFCIN in the operation of the SENSINT system does not consider postoperational data on their flights as being sensitive in this degree or kind from that sensitivity attached to the handling of the product itself. They seem not to be impressed by the factors of altitude, range, or track inasmuch as, say they, the capabilities of the U-2 are known in the Air Force. And since the fact of overflight is revealed by the photography itself, they do not find track of any great significance from a security point of view and as distinct from TALENT security. AFCIN has promised me a position statement which I will make available to you promptly.

3. I am attaching as Tab A the views of the Project Security Officer.

4. I am attaching as Tab B a comparison of the essential features of the TALENT and SENSINT security systems. The essentials of this paper I brief for you here:

- a. Both systems have about the same personnel security standards though TCS is somewhat higher.
  - b. Both are based on the MUST KNOW principle.
  - c. Both follow essentially the same security procedures for handling of materials except Lewis has to approve reproduction of any piece whereas, as you know, we only insist upon security control and MUST KNOW principle.
  - d. Both systems are based on decentralized clearance in accordance with standards, but the TCS, unlike the SS, has central billet approval.
  - e. As mentioned above, the SS system does not accord postoperations information as being distinct in sensitivity from that required in the handling of the product.
5. Recommendation. I recommend you approve the paper immediately attached hereto.

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JAMES Q. REBER  
CIA TALENT Control Officer

Attachments (TCS-2905-58 cys 1 & 19)

- A. SAPC-25827 cy 1&2
- B. TCS-2653-58 cy 1&2

JQR:cw

- 1-Project Director w/atts
- 2-TCO
- 3-TCS chrono